Formal linkage mechanisms Essay

Formal linkage mechanisms such as mergers and crossroads ventures are supposed to reduce transaction costs in a business enterprise. However, sometimes companies can experience increase cost if the management fails to lay down proper strategies (Jones, 2006). It is worth noting that joint venture refers to two or more parties coming together to carry out business activities. In this case, these parties agree to share revenues and expenses.On the other hand, mergers entail two or more companies joining but each maintains their identity. The likely causes of increase costs In both mergers and joint ventures, there is the possibility of double running of the departments(Jones, 2006). This comes about by failure of the companies to do away with similar operating departments. For instance, when the joined and merged companies each maintain their human beings resource department, the topics are increased expenses in running the departments.Increased company cost can as well result fro m uncertainty about the future by the trading partners. In this regard, the resulting merger or joint venture has to cater for the associated risks. For instance, the possibility of one or more parties pulling out will result to increased cost since the ratio of sharing cost changes. Conclusion and Recommendations The above factors would contribute to an upward burn in the companys transactions costs.Therefore, it would be of significance for the computer company to consider the adjacent recommendations. The companies should review their former organizational structure by joining departments that perform similar functions to avoid duplication. Moreover, the companies in the merger should work out a plan towards reducing uncertainty costs such as increasing the number of partners in the merger (Jones, 2006).

Heart of Darkness Study Guide Essay

Chapter 11. The setting of the story begins on the Nellie, a ship. The turn of the scend is significant because it gives the earthly concern proponent on board extra clip to talk, and Marlow begins single outing his story. In addition, attributeically, the turning of the soar up expects a change, and perhaps, foreshadowing of the story. The author spends a lot of m dealing with light because it is the main symbol in the novella. Light and darkness ar universal symbols that represent good and evil.Although non explicitly stated, those who charter the light are those who are civilized, and those who acquire the darkness are those who remain uncivilized, peculiarly the people living in Africa. 2. Marlow expects different from every unmatched else on the ship because of how the author describes Marlows character. Conrad describes Marlow as having recessed cheeks, a yellow complexion, and resembling that of an idol. Marlow seems ill through this description. Sunken cheeks convey a need of nourish handst, as well as exhaustion.The color yellow in literature has two meanings happiness and sickness. In this context, one may infer the color yellow to symbolize Marlows sickness, or molderion, as it correlates to the alight of his description. Lastly, an idol connotes a phantom. Marlow appears to be different from everyone on the ship through his description. The audience is civilized. All of the men have jobs, a lawyer, an accountant, the director, and the outside narrator. The story also explains how Marlow remained the only one out of the men to tacit follow the sea. He also portrays how he did not represent his class. This suggests that Marlow may not be as civilized as the other men.As Marlow begins to tell his story, the narrator explains how Marlow is about to embark on other inconclusive experience. The word inconclusive suggests not fully answering doubts and questions. In addition, Marlow begins to remark the weakness of galore(postnominal) tellers of tales who seem so often unaware of what their audience would best like to hear. This conveys how Marlow hopes to interest, or intrigue, his audience. Marlow feels inclined to sell his story so that his audience better understands him.3. The Roman reacted to England, a dark place, by civilizing it, or control its territory. At that time, England looked like the very end of the world. It possessed sand banks, marshes,woodlands, savages. The story conveys how in that respect was little to ingest for a civilized man and only the Thames water for drink. England was a dark place at that time because it was uncivilized. 4. According to Marlow, what redeems the conquest of the Earth is the idea only the idea that men will unselfishly feed themselves for. Marlow explains how conquering land, and the lands people, really is not a pretty thing.I think Marlow breaks clear up because it is a sensitive subject for him to discuss, and maybe only something he truly understands. 5. Marlow keeps comparing the river to a serpent. The equation is interesting because a serpent symbolizes evil, corruption, and temptation. Similar to the story of Adam and Eve, a snake, or the river in this case, tempts the protagonist. 6. digression from knitting, the two women in the office appear to be secretaries, or receptionists, for the doctor. Both women appear to symbolize mickle they are the fates who spin, measure, or cute the thread of life.This symbol is an allusion to Greek mythology. As Marlow is progressing toward his locomote to Africa, it is in the conjunctions office that he meets these two women. 7. Fresleven went insane because he had spent so much time in the jungle. After attempting to stab the village chief, Fresleven was killed. The conflict began with an argument over a couple of hens, which appeal him, his life. The village became addicted because the natives became superstitious they were all very afraid to kill a white man. 8. Marlows Aunt calls Ma rlow an emissary of light because she believes that during his journey to Africa, Marlow is going to bring knowledge and civilization to the savages.This reflects the imperialism during that time catamenia. 9. The jellyfish is a lifeless forested stretch of coast. Once they reach the Congo River, Marlow boards another ship to journey further upriver. The man-of-war portends the lifelessness of many coasts in Africa most parts of the place appear corrupt and dreary. 10. Marlow describes the companions station as a Grove of Death, in which among the trees there are dying natives and recurring dynamite blasts.I think the natives allowed themselves to be bullied by the white men because they felt inferior. During this time, imperialism was popular and the belief that a white man was better than a b lack man was common. I also do not think natives had the befitting technology, means, or knowledge to necessarily stand up to a group of white men either. 11. The accountant is described as an elegant white man with a clean andwell-mannered appearance. The accountant is described as a miracle because he represents the Company, or how the Company wishes to be seen. The accountant is devoted to the Company. The station animal trainer is described as an average man.The managers supreme gift is his ability to never get sick. Marlow does not like the station manager because he is jealous of Kurtz, and also because Marlow describes him as originating zero. This suggests how the manager lacks innovation and is devoted to keeping up with appearances, although he has nothing to offer. The manager comments about how men should only come out here if they dont have anything inside. This conveys that in order to succeed in the pearl trade business and survive in Africa, one must be ruthless. 12. The brick maker appears to be idle as Marlow remarks on how there wasnt a fragment of a brick anywhere in the station.The brick maker is waiting for his opportunity to move up the r avel within the company. 13. Kurtz painting is of a blindfolded woman carrying a lighted torch, in which her face is appears deceived by shadows. I suppose the painting reflects the men traveling to Africa, blindfolded, to civilize the natives, who represent the light. The woman is blindfolded as the European men are blinded by their negative influence on the natives. The shadows suggest darkness, which suggests corruption. 14. The manager and brick maker are upset at Kurtz pre-eminence because they are envious at his success.This conveys the competition, desperation, and corruption during this time period to do whatever it takes to be successful, powerful, and rich. For these European men, money was power and that was their desire. Marlow lies to the brick maker by playing on to further understand his motives. In addition, Marlow allows the brick maker to think he has an influence in Europe to dispatch information about Kurtz. 15. Marlow was unable to get the rivets from the Comp any.This suggests how the enterprise is allowing loose policies and for things to follow apart this conveys a lack of professionalism. The manager does not want the rivets to make it out because he wants his eldorado Exploring Expedition to follow through. 16. The Eldorado Exploring Expedition suggests an expedition in search for gold during this time. Although there was no gold in Africa, pearl was very valuable. This expedition was led by the managers uncle. Its purpose is to find ivory and apply African resources.Chapter 21. The manager survives because he cannot get sick. His plan to beat Kurtz is by delaying the trip to the upcountry Station, that way hopefully Kurtz illness will kill him because he will not receive the proper care in time. 2. The crew of the steamboat was the cannibals. Although savage, the cannibals are much better at controlling their behavior than the pilgrims. The pilgrims appear willing to begin destruction at any cause in order to gain ivory. The inte rpretation of civilized seems to belong to those who are able to exercise self-restraint. 3. The drums symbolize the culture that still exists in Africa.The forest appears to be moving throughout the journey, which may be foreshadowing how the natives are moving with the boat to confirm that it does not meet Kurtz. 4. The earth seemed unearthly suggests the discomfort Marlow feels along his journey. On a larger scale, this conveys how Africa has sustain a place lacking of normality and humanity Marlow expresses how he feels separated from Earth. That was the worst of us, the suspicion that they werent human, suggests how corrupt the men were they appear to show no signs of humanity.5. Marlow discovers a book about seamanship. The book appears admirable because it is the only bit of reality Marlow has encountered recently. 6. When they wake up, eight miles from the station, the coast has been covered in a wooden-headed fog which keeps them stationary. The fog is a white, however, it does not represent light or goodness. The fog suggests how Marlows travel does not know exactly where they are or what lies ahead in their journey everything appears unclear physically and emotionally. 7. Marlow claims that the natives will not attack because the nature of their noise seems to convey sadness. In addition, Marlow does not understand how there could be an attack with the severe fog.8. The sounding man is killed startle in the attack because he is the first man seen. The river comes to symbolize not only the way in which Marlow begins his journey into himself, but as they proceed further up the river, Marlow begins to realize he has more in common with the natives than Europeans. In addition, the river continues to represent the touchwood of temptation. The helmsman gets killed because he began to freak out, abandoning his position to grab a gun. Marlow drives the natives away by using the steam-whistle. 9. Marlow valued to meet Kurtz because he had heard such interesting, wild things about him. Kurtzrepresents the thrilling and horrifying wildness that Marlow desired. Kurtz abandoned his life in Europe to quest for fortune in Africa.10. Kurtz head was compared to that of an ivory ball. This suggests how important ivory was to this man it was the only thing on his mind. Conrad uses a simile, irony, as well as symbolism to convey this. 11. Kurtz paper is about how white men must treat Africans as though the white men are much greater, super natural creations so that they can exert power over them. At the end, the scribble proclaims to exterminate all brutes. 12. The harlequin is the Russian man, Kurtz disciple. The harlequin knows a lot about Kurtz, he claims to only listen to Kurtz, and he acts only has information for Marlow. Chapter 31. The harlequin is boyish in appearance, and he is young. His brightly patched clothes are similar to the maps in the office Marlow had admired. The harlequin represents youth and adventure. The harlequi n is still alive due to Kurtz influence. 2. The stakes outside of Kurtz compound were human heads. Most were faced in, duration a couple was faced outward. They are the heads of rebels. 3. A group of native Africans carry Kurtz on a stretcher. Marlow describes Kurtz as resembling an animated image of death carved out of ivory.This further suggests how Kurtz was willing to die in pursuit of ivory, which symbolizes power. 4. Kurtz brings his guns with him. Since the natives view Kurtz as a deity, they believe that the guns hold great power. Kurtz brings them to further emphasize his power over the natives. 5. The wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman is a native woman, Kurtz mistress. Conrad pairs here with being a warrior. 6. Right before Kurtz dies, Marlow recognizes all of Kurtz emotions. This relates to Kurtz last words the horror The horror because perhaps Kurtz realise that the life he was living was actually not worth dying for. Marlow blows out the candle because it is sym bolical of Kurtz life.7. He had something to say relates to Kurtz, who always had something to say, while Marlow had nothing to say. Marlow believes that Kurtz last words are a triumph because he thinks he realized his negative impact in the world and his corruption at that moment. 8. keister in the city, Marlow discovers that Kurtz had many other talents such as a gift in music and writing. 9. Marlow gives up the idea that the Europeans belong in Africa. He has gone about doing that by no longer choosing to pursue that lifestyle. 10. The Intended is Kurtz fiance.Sheis described as being dishy and often connected with imagery of light and heaven. Marlows belief that women live in beautiful worlds, which should not be disturbed, is relevant here as this beautiful woman is not intertwined with Kurtz alter lifestyle, his corrupt lifestyle. 11. Kurtz Intended claimed to have known him more than anyone else on Earth. However, she did not know the type of lifestyle Kurtz was living. Mar low tells the Intended that Kurtz last words were for her name.Marlow claims that it would have been too dark to tell her the truth. I think the Heart of Darkness is when one allows him or herself to live in a mendacious reality, allowing themselves to lie and deceive others for their own benefit.

Macroeconomics – institutions by Acemoglu

In Progress. Abstract In this paper, we discuss how and why institutions broadly, the stinting and semi goernmental fundamental law of societies affect scotch incentives and outcomes. After briefly canvas a identification subprogram of theories of institutional differences across countries, we rivet on two questions why societies may rent institutions that atomic number 18 non pricey for economic development, and why institutions, even bad Institutions, persist.In light of the Ideas we develop, we discuss iii case studies of Institutions alluding and persistence the united States, India and Guatemala. L. Introduction Institutions, defined broadly as the policy-making and economic organization of societies, differ markedly across countries and everyw here(predicate) succession. For warning, until recently, a erect number of societies were organized along left lines, with widespread collective ownership of the entails of output signal and centrally planned re i nauguration allocation, while practically of the rest of the world was capitalist, with predominantly private ownership and resources allocated Vela markets.For much of the 1 8th and 9th centuries, a number of societies, Including the Caribbean, much of Central and Latin the States, and parts of Asia, were organized with policy-making and economic ability concentrated in the passs of a small elite, and relied on productive relationships based on slavery and exponentd labor. In contrast, economic and political power was more(prenominal) equally distributed in parts of Europe, northwesterly America and Australia, and the absolute majority of laborers were free.Similarly, as emphasized by mating and doubting Thomas (1973), North and Whiniest (1989) and Till (1 990), there were Important differences In the organization of the European societies during the 17th century. While England and the Netherlands had developed limited g everywherenments, France and Spain had absolutist regimes.Economic theory and basic plebeian sense suggest that differences in the organization of conjunction should endure an effect on economic outcomes when institutions attend that a potential investor has lieu rights over the proceeds from his Investments, he Is more likely to invest than when he carrys the fruits of his efforts to be stockn by different parties In the economy or by the government. An obvious hypothesis is and then to link variations in economic per hurlance across countries to their institutions. We refer to this focalize of gaze as the institutions hypothesis.According to one version of this hypothesis, what is crucial is whether the organization of the caller ensures that a broad cross-section of the society have stiff post rights, so that those with productive emphasis on a broad cross-section of the society is meant to buzz off the notion that it is not sufficient for the rights of a small elite, lan smoothers, dictators or Politburo members , to be enforced. Citizens ask to have effective belongings rights, and be involved in politics, at least slightly point, to ensure the continuation of these repertory rights in the future.Do we see marked differences in the economic performance of societies with diametrical institutions? The examples mentioned in the counterbalance separate suggest so while West Germany prospered with a capitalist system, East Germany did much slight headspring under friendlyism. While Western Europe, North America and Australia grew rapidly, the elite-dominated societies of the Caribbean, Central America and India stagnated throughout the 18th and nineteenth centuries. As emphasized by North and Thomas (1973), while England and the Netherlands prospered during the 17th century, Spain and France failed to do so.Also telling be cases where large changes in institutions argon correlated with radically changed developing paths. Examples of this argon Argentina in the sasss with the jump -start of populism and Person, South Korea during the early sasss with the transition from the Rhea to the Park regime, and Indonesia in 1965 with the transition between Saguaro and Short. In addition to these selective examples, much empirical evidence suggests that institutional differences be a major source of the differences in economic performance across countries.For example, cross-country work by a number of economists and political scientists found a first-order effect of institutions on produce or the level of income (e. G. , Knack and Keeper, 1995, or sign of the zodiac and Jones, 1999). more(prenominal) recently, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) we found that as much as % of the income gap between the top and come home of the world income distribution may be overdue to differences in their institutions. 4 But these findings pose as many questions as they answer 1 . If some institutions generate more income and growth, why do a large number of societies adop t institutions that are bad for economic development? . Why do institutions that are detrimental to economic performance persist rather than being overhauled at the first opportunity? disdain the importance of these questions for understanding differences in economic performance across countries, there is relatively little search on this topic. In this paper, we develop a number of conjectures related to these questions. Then, in light of these ideas, we discuss three case studies of institution building and persistence the U. S. , India and Guatemala.In the process, we in like manner domiciliate a brief survey of a number of theories of comparative degree institutions. II. Institutions As emphasized in the introduction, our focus is on the set of institutions the organization of society that determine economic incentives. Why such(prenominal) institutions and social arrangements go forth affect economic outcomes is assort economic actors allow only undertake investments whe n they expect to be rewarded for their spending and effort. In a society where property rights are not well enforced, investment and output willing be low.We hence take the degree of enforcement of property rights to be a central feature of the institutions and the broad organization of a society. To of private property, which we take to correspond to a set of institutions ensuring that a broad cross-section of society have effective property rights. 2. Extractive institutions, which throw in political power in the hands of a small elite. With senselessctive institutions, the majority of the creation does not have effective property rights, since the political power of the elite means that they can hold up the citizens after they undertake their investments.We expect institutions of private property to encourage investment and development, while extractive institutions are less likely to dead to high investment and successful economic outcomes. Notice that there is more to inst itutions than the profound code or the formal definition of property rights at a point in time in particular, political institutions matter. This is for the simple reason that in a society where there are some constraints on political elites, these agents can change the legal code or manipulate the vivacious property rights to their advantage. Therefore, effective constraints on political elites are an essential ingredient of institutions of private property. In reality, there are many intermediate cases teens the extremes of institutions of private property and extractive institutions, and a complex interaction between the exact form of the political and economic institutions and whether they provide effective property rights protection to citizens. There is also a recently and baffling question of how the raise commits to providing property rights to the citizens (see Whiniest, 1997, for a discussion of this problem).To limit the discussion, we do not focus on these issues. So what determines whether a society ends up with institutions of private property or extractive institutions? Let us distinguish four broad theories, which we call 1. The effective institutions view. 2. The incidental institutions view. 3. The rent-seeking view. 4. The incompatible institutions view. We now discuss what we mean by these distinguishable views, and examine some selective examples of institutional theories falling within each category. . The businesslike Institutions View According to this view, societies will choose the institutions that maximise their total surplus. How this surplus will be distributed among different groups or agents does not affect the extract of institutions. The underlying abstract thought of this view comes from the displace Theorem. Ronald Cease (1960) argued that when different economic parties could negotiate costless, they will be able to bargain to internalize potential externalities.The farmer, who suffers from the pollution create d by the nearby factor outy, can pay the factory owner to reduce pollution. The same reasoning can be applied to political situations. If the current laws or institutions benefit a received group while creating a disproportionate cost for another, these two groups can negotiate to change the institutions. By doing so they will ontogeny the size of the total surplus (the pie that they have to divide between themselves), and they can hen bargain over the distribution of this additional surplus.Many different versions of the good institutions view have been proposed. Demesne (1967) argued that private property emerged from everyday property when land become sufficiently scarce and valuable that it was streamlined to privative it. Other famous examples are Cases (1936) earlier work and the more formal analysis by Grossman and Hart (1986), is more have-to doe with with the brass instrument of firms or markets than the political organization of societies, but his reasoning was gui ded by the same principle.North ND Thomas applied this reasoning to the record of feudal institutions arguing that they were an economic contract between serfs and Lords. While Williamson and North and Thomas do not specify how different parties will reach agreement to achieve efficient institutions, Becker (1960) and Whitman (1989) have investigated how democracies can reach such agreements via competition among pressure groups and political parties.In their view, an inefficient institution cannot be stable because a political entrepreneur has an incentive to propose a better institution and with the extra surplus generated will be able to top him more attractive to voters. We believe that, despite powerfulnessy emphasizing certain forces that are likely to be at work, the efficient institutions view does not provide the right textile for an analysis of the differences in institutions across countries. Both historical and econometric evidence suggests that the economic costs to societies of extractive institutions have been substantial.For example, our estimates in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) suggest that changing Insignias or Sierra Lenss institutions to those of Chile loud lead, in the long run, to a more than 7-fold increase in these countries income. It is difficult to argue that these institutions are therefore efficient for Nigeria, Sierra Leone or many other less-developed countries in Africa or Latin America. In the rest of the paper, we therefore focus on theories of institutions where societies may end up with institutions that are not optimal for aggregate growth or income. 2.The Incidental Institutions View The efficient institutions view is explicitly based on economic reasoning the costs and benefits of different institutions are weighed against each other to determine which institutions should prevail. Efficiency arises because individuals calculate accordance of rightsing to the social costs and benefits. Institutions are th erefore choices. A different approach, popular among many political scientists and sociologists, is to downplay choices over institutions, but think of institutions as the by-product of other social interactions. Here, we discuss three such theories.The first is the theory developed by Barrington Moore (1966) in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the second is Tills (1990) and Herbs (2001) theory of state formation, heap the third is Burners (1976) theory of the emergence of capitalist economy in England. Barrington Moore constructed his famous theory in an attempt to relieve the different paths of political development in Britain, Germany and Russia. In particular, he investigated why Britain had evolved into a democracy, while Germany succumbed to fascism and Russia had a communist revolution.Moore stressed the extent of centralization of kitchen-gardening and resulting labor relations in the countryside, the strength of the bourgeoisie, and the nature of class coalitions. In his theory, democracy emerged when there was a strong, politically assertive, immemorial middle class, and when agriculture had commercialese so that there were no feudal labor relations in the countryside. Fascism arose when the middle classes were weak and entered into a political coalition with landowners.Finally, a agriculture was not commercialese and rural labor was repressed through feudal relationships. In Moors theory, therefore, class coalitions and the way agriculture is organized determine which political institutions will emerge. Although Moore is not explicitly concerned with economic development, it is a direct implication of his analysis that societies may end up with institutions that do not maximize income or growth, for example, when they take the communist revolution path.While this theory is highly suggestive and clearly captures some of the potentially significant comparative facts there are clear problems with it. For instance, though Moors rema rk no bourgeoisie, no democracy is famous, it is not clear from his analysis whether this is Just an empirical correlation or a causal theory. More generally, Moore does not clarify the connection between the formation of class coalitions and political outcomes. It is also not clear whether this theory is empirically successful.There are many examples of societies with relatively strong capitalist classes in Latin America, such as Argentina and Chile, which did not understand the transition to a consolidated democracy until recently. In fact, in these societies capitalist classes appear to have supported the coups against democracy, suggesting that the role of the poor segments of the society (the working class) in motivator demagnification could be more important than that of the bourgeoisie (see Archduchesses, Stephens and Stephens, 1992, Guacamole and Robinson, Bibb).In a very different vein, Till (1990), building on the Hibernia tradition, proposed a theory of the formation of modern states. He argued extensively that modern state institutions such as fiscal systems, bureaucracy and parliaments are closely related to the need to raise resources to fight wars and thus arose in places with incessant inter-state competition. Herbs (2001) has recently provided a substantive extension of this line of research by applying it to the evolution of state institutions in Africa.He argues that the poor functioning of many modern African states is due to the fact that they caked the featureshigh existence density and inter-state warfare necessary for the emergence of the modern state. Although interesting and sweeping, this theory does not seem to accord well with a number of major facts. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we documented that among the former colonies, it was the less densely settled places that became well-to-doer.In fact, North America, Australia and New Zealand were very sparsely settled in 1 500, especially when compared to West Afric a around the same time. Despite this, they developed effective states and institutions of private property. This suggests that the issues stressed by Till and Herbs are not the major determinants of institutions, at least, in the context of the development of institutions among the former European colonies, including Africa. Burners (1976) theory of the rise of capitalism in Europe can also be thought as an example of the incidental institutions view.Although Brenner subscribes to the red ink view of feudalism as an extractive institution (see next subsection), he interprets the rise of capitalism as the byproduct of the collapse of breathing social institutions after the Black Death. Brenner argues that the decline of feudalism resulted from the successful class repugn by the relatively properly British peasantry. Brenner, however, believes that the peasantrys aim was not to build capitalism capitalism unless emerged like an incidental phoenix from the ashes of feudalism.Becau se, economic growth required this set of (extractive) institutions to be replaced by capitalist institutions. Therefore, Burners work also bumps us an incidental- institutions theory for why some societies grow faster. None of these theories provide a framework that is at the same time consistent tit the first-order facts of comparative development and useful for generating predictions. Therefore, it is difficult to apply these theories to understand why some countries develop extractive institutions.Moreover, being trained as economists, we find it to be a shortcoming of this group of theories that institutions and political outcomes arise as byproducts, not as the direct consequences of actions interpreted by rational agents. The fact that the key outcomes are byproducts of other interactions, not choices, leads to the additional problem that these theories practically do not generate tight empirical predictions (I. E. Comparative placid). But an analysis of comparative develop ment, supra all else, requires comparative static results regarding when institutions of private property will emerge.In the re principal(prenominal)der of the paper, we therefore focus on the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views to build a simple framework for comparative development. 3. The Rent-seeking View According to this view, institutions are not always chosen by the whole society (and not for the benefit of the whole society), but by the groups that run political power at the time (perhaps as a result of conflict with other groups demanding more rights). These groups will choose the institutions that maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that maximize total surplus.For example, institutions that enforce property rights by restricting state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler who wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler would be reducing his own future r ents, so may well prefer extractive institutions to institutions of private property. Therefore, equilibrium institutions will not be those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the powerful groups. Why doesnt a Cease theorem type reasoning apply?Although a large literature, especially in industrial organization, has emphasized how informational problems may limit the empirical applications of the Cease theorem, we believe that the main reason for the non-applicability of the Cease theorem in politics is commitment problems (see Guacamole, 2001, for a more detailed discussion of this issue). If a ruler has political power concentrated in his hands, he cannot commit not to expropriate assets or revenues in the future. in effect(p) property rights require that he credibly relinquishes political power to some extent.But according to the Occasion bargain, he has to be compensated for what he could have received using this power. Herein lies the pr oblem. When he relinquishes his power, then he has no guarantees that he will receive the promised payments in the future. Therefore, by their very nature, institutions that regulate political and social power create commitment problems, and prevent Occasion bargains that are necessary to reach efficient outcomes. As an application, consider the decision of a powerful rich elite to mount a coup in a populist redistributive regime, such as that of Salvador Allendale in Chile in 1973.By undertaking a coup, the rich will ensure that economically. Why wouldnt the elite enter into a Occasion bargain with Allendale who would wish to place future restrictions on taxes so as to remove the threat of the coup? The problem, as pointed out and canvass in Guacamole and Robinson (2001 a), is that the democracy cannot promise not to increase taxes again once the threat of the coup disappears. By its very nature, taxes are set by the politically powerful agents, determined by the institutions at t hat time.Promises make at the past may be worthless when they are not backed by political power. The first systematic development of this point of view is the economics literature is North (1981), who argued in the chapter on A Neoclassical Theory of the State that agents who controlled the state should be modeled as self-interested. He then argued that the set of property rights which they would choose for society would be those that maximized their payoff and because of transactions costs these would not necessarily be the set which maximized social welfare.Though his analysis does not clarify what he meant by transactions costs, problems of commitment might be one mispronunciation for this. The notion that elites may opt for extractive institutions to increase their incomes is of course also present in much of the Marxist and dependency theory literature. For example, Dobb (1948), Brenner (1976) and Hilton (1981) saw feudalism, contrary to North and Thomas (1976)gs model, as a se t of institutions designed to extract rents from the peasants at the write down of social welfare.Dependency theorists such as Wholesalers (1974-1982), Rodney (1972), Frank (1978) and card and Falsetto (1979) argued that the international trading system was designed to extract rents from developing countries to the benefit of developed Mounties. Perhaps, the earliest, and a great deal ignored, contribution to this line of reasoning is in the book by Beard (1913). Anticipating many of the insights of rational choice political science literature, Beard argued that the U. S.Constitution was an institution designed to benefit those who wrote it (such as James Madison) at the expense of the rest of society. Another important example of inefficient institutions designed to extract rents from the society is the Spanish colonial system (Stein and Stein, 1970, Coauthors, 1978, Lockhart and Schwartz, 1983). Finally, the notion that leaver is an inefficient institution designed to extract rents from slaves is also widespread (for example, Williams, 1944, Geneses, 1963, Beckoned, 1972).More recent, and for our purposes more relevant, contributions in this tradition have sought to explain comparative development. For example, in the context of Africa, Bates (1981) formulated an prestigious and important theory based on rent-seeking by elites. Bates argued that when elites were not invested in the productive sectors of the economy, mostly agriculture in the context of Africa, and had to rely on urban interests to remain in power, they were likely to distort prices, for example by using marketing boards to transfer resources from the rural areas to the cities.The implications of this for political stability and economic growth were disastrous. kindle and Soulful (1997, 2000) have used related ideas to analyze long-term development in the Americas. They argued that the different paths of development observed in North and Latin America in the last 300 years were due to i nstitutional differences. In North America institutions promoted development, in Latin America they did not. Why did Latin America develop a set of institutions that impeded Caribbean, the factor endowments were suitable for growing crops such as dulcifycane.Such crops had large technical scale economies and could be cultivated by slaves, factors that led to large concentrations of landownership and repressive institutions designed to control labor. Therefore, despite their costs for economic development, extractive institutions were adopted by elites who benefited from the system. On the other hand, in North America, factor endowments were suitable for growing crops with limited scale economies such as wheat, and this led to an egalitarian distribution of land, income and political power.Their theory therefore emphasizes the impact of factor endowments and technology on inequality and institutions building, and ultimately economic development. In Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2 000, 2001 a), we developed a complementary theory, emphasizing how European colonialists set up institutions of private property in areas where they settled in large numbers, since these institutions were directly affecting their own investments and well-being. This led us to emphasize how European settlements ere often conducive to the development of institutions of private property in the colonies.In contrast, European colonists introduced or took over existing extractive institutions in other colonies. They were more likely to do so when they did not settle, for example due to an indecent disease milieu, and when extractive institutions were more profitable, for example, as in Central America where the densely settled large race could be forced to work for low wages in plantations or mines. These extractive institutions did not benefit the society as a whole, but they were inefficacy for the Europeans, who held the political power and were the extractors.We believe that the re nt-seeking view provides the best framework for thinking about why certain countries ended up with extractive institutions, and provides a number of useful comparative static, which will be discussed in office Ill. 4. The Inappropriate Institutions View According to this view, institutions may be efficient when they are introduced, but they are also costly to change (see below on this). Therefore, institutions that are efficient for a set of circumstances may no chronic be efficient once the environment hinges. Nevertheless, it may be difficult or too costly to change these institutions at this point.The idea here goes back to Crosschecking (1963). In the context of financial institutions, Crosschecking argued that certain arrangements, such as bank finance, might be more appropriate for backward countries trying to catch up. This is widely thought to be a good explanation for why banks are more prevalent in Germany, even today when Germany is no longer a backward country. So perh aps, social arrangements that were introduced at some point as an optimal resolution to the resistances may move to prevail, even after they cease to be the optimal response.In the context of financial institutions, this point is developed in Guacamole, Action and Kilobit (2001). Another economic example is the QWERTY typewriter keyboard. David (1986) argued that this was appropriate at the time because it slowed down the speed of typing, when the rudimentary nature of typewriters meant that rapid typing would make them Jam. However, despite the fact that the QWERTY arrangement was inefficient once the basic technology improved soon after, it has similar thesis.Perhaps, extractive institutions were appropriate for certain resistances, but they continue to apply even after they cease to be the efficient institutional arrangement. Related ideas have been suggested in the literature. For example, Wittingly (1957) argued that centralized despotism, which may not have been very costly in terms of economic outcomes in China before the 1 5th century and arose as the result of providing desirable world goods such as irrigation, persisted almost to the present, creating a substantial economic and social burden.Given how long institutions persist (see Section V) the view that institutions of a different age ay continue to apply even when they become costly to economic success is highly plausible. Nevertheless, in the context of comparative development, it appears more useful to combine the inappropriate institutions view with the rent-seeking view, explicitly allowing for political elites to introduce inefficient institutions. In fact, in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2001 a), we suggested a hypothesis combining the rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views, and provided evidence in favor of this hypothesis.We argued and empirically demonstrated that extractive institutions, tit power concentrated in the hand of a small elite, were much less costly during the age of agriculture than during the age of industry. When agriculture is the main source of income, and the political elite owns the land, this elite will have, to a first approximation, adequate incentives to increase the productivity of the land. In contrast, in the age of industry, many different agents, not previously part of the ruling elite, need to undertake investments and be involved in productive activities.Without effective property rights, these agents are unlikely to invest, so extractive institutions become much more costly once industrialization opportunities arrive on the scene. This explains why the sugar colonies of Barbados, Haiti and Jamaica were amongst the richest places in the world in 1700 but rapidly fell behind when industrial technologies became available. Overall, we therefore conclude that to understand the significant differences in how countries are organized, we need to move away from the pure efficiency view.Moreover, existing series of instituti onal differences based on the incidental institutions view cannot provide a satisfactory tarring point, and make less sharp empirical predictions, since institutions are simply byproducts of other social actions. Instead, we believe that conflict over the distribution of rents matters, and the rent seeking view provides the best starting place for an analysis of institutional differences across countries.In addition, there may be an important element of the inappropriate institutions view, so that institutions that were introduced at a certain point in time may become less appropriate and more harmful in the future, but may still remain in place. Ill. Institutional Origins The rent-seeking and inappropriate institutions views do not straightway generate a theory of comparative institutions. They simply point out that inefficient institutions may be chosen by political elites, and the institutions in place may become more costly for growth over time.As discussed above, by the instit utions hypothesis, we mean that differences in the development experiences of countries can be explained by differences in their institutions. To make this hypothesis operational, we need to choose institutions of private property. In other words, we need to develop comparative static on institution building. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of the pioneering theories of institutions, such as North (1981), give us few clues about when we should expect extractive institutions to prevail.Here, we highlight a few potential determinants of what type of institutions politically powerful groups will choose 1. Economic Interests A first determinant of whether institutions of private property will emerge is whether they will lead to outcomes that are in interests of the politically powerful agents. For example, institutions that restrict state predation will not be in the interest of a ruler ho wants to appropriate assets in the future.Yet this strategy may be in the interest of a ru ler who recognizes that only such guarantees will encourage citizens to undertake substantial investments or lend him money, or will protect his own rents. They will also be in the interest of the major groups that can undertake investment in production activities in the future. Anger and Solidify explanation for why extractive institutions emerged in the Caribbean but not in North America falls within this category. In the Caribbean, the factor endowments made extractive institutions more profitable for the elite.In particular, sugar production, which could transaction economies of scale and profitably employ slave labor, was conducive to a society where a small elite would control both political and economic power. Our argument in Guacamole, Johnson and Robinson (2000) for why European settlement in the colonies led to institutions of private property is also based on the same reasoning. When a large number of Europeans settled in an area, they preferred institutions enforcing pr operty rights, since these property rights would enable them to undertake investments.Our argument in Guacamole Johnson and Robinson (2001 a) is also related. There, we suggested that high population density and relative prosperity (I. E. , GAP per capita) of the colonized territory encouraged European colonialists to set up extractive institutions. The reasoning is that high population density implied a large labor force that Europeans could force to work for low wages, and both high population density and the relative prosperity of the population provided Europeans with a greater resource base for extraction or taxation. Economic interests therefore suggest that we should expect extractive institutions to develop when the powerful agents have little to gain from enforcing property sights because they have few investment opportunities themselves and are not linked to other productive agents in the society, and when there are resources, such as crops or abundant labor, that can be e ffectively exploited by extractive 2.Political Losers Another important factor is whether institutional development will destabilize the system, making it less likely that elites will remain in power after reforms. An institutional setup encouraging investment and adoption of new technologies may be out of use(p) by elites when they fear that this process of growth and social change will

In This Essay the Myth of Equality Between Men and Women Will Be Discussed and Progress Made by Women so Far, for the Fight of Equality Will Be Examined.

Year 10 ENGLISH Assessment 13 Using Language to Persuade Unit 1 offspring 3 Analyse the give of expression in texts that present a point of view on a current issue. TASK Produce theme that analyses the use of language in persuasive texts. You leave behind have two class periods to complete this assessment task. The prior two periods will be to prepare. examen conditions will apply throughout the writing of the assessment.. You must analyse 2 written texts, which will be provided at the beginning of your first preparation lesson.You may use a dictionary (bring your own). You may similarly bring in one sheet of notes to the assessment writing classes. On the reverse of this sheet at that place is a copy of the Assessment Criteria for this task. You should produce a minimum of one page per text to be analysed. Each text should have a minimum of one page uninflectedal essay. Your opinion on the issue in the persuasive text, SHOULD NOT be included as a part of your analytic essay .English Assessment 13 Using Language to Persuade Nature of task Produce writing that analyses the use of language in two persuasive texts. Students Name _______________________________________________________________________ 5 4 3 2 1 Criterion 1 Knowledge Analysis and omparison of ways in which language is used to shoes readers. (10 marks) 1. Analysis of language Sophisticated Detailed Analysis Some Little 2.Expression of the ways in which language of selected persuasive texts isInsightful Careful Some Limited Little used to position readers in a particular way Criterion 2 Expressive and coherent writing, with appropriate use of metalanguage (10 marks) 1.Expressive and coherent High Expressive General Clear Simple 2. Appropriate metalanguage High Relevant generally Some Limited Marks_____/20 Teacher comments/areas for improvement___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

The airline industry in the US Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

The airline industry in the US - Essay ExampleThe best examples ar frequent flier program and customers brand loyalty. When customers gather their miles in the same airlines they fucking redeem their points to get some rewards. The industry has low-cost competitors and legacy carriers. affordable competitors like jet-blue, focus on the low-cost routes and point-to-point service. They have the diversity of routes in short distance which can increase their demand and increase their revenue. For legacy carriers, like Delta, they offer some international routes which cover turgid geographic areas and they also offer the better experience for customers. There are some ways to buy the farm more competitive. The companies in the airline industry need to provide the better quality of service. E-tickets are a good example since customers can check in online it may be more convenient for them to transmit the aeroplane. Also, existing companies in the airline industry should lower their cost to gain more profits. The cost includes bout fee for the airport and the labour fee. Location is also a good way for them to become more competitive by offering flights for popular routes. Companies in airline industry should also attract customers from substitutes because customers are very price sensitive, thus the option for them to differentiate products is very limited. For example, if in short distance, customers would like to fasten on cars and trains for travelling. Also for business customers that always go to other cities to meet with their clients or have the conference.

Questions on Economic Principles Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Questions on Economic Principles - Assignment ExampleThe belief of Own Price ginger snap of Demand revolves around the formula of % change in the quantity demanded over a % change in the equipment casualty (Sloman, 2009). Price Elasticity of Demand (Formula) = %?Qd/%?P The determinants for the Price Elasticity of Demand are the twist of refinement substitutes available, the proportion of income spent and the time period. In this case the cabbages present a number of close substitutes hence it will be more elastic in terms of the variation in price. The baby elasticity of demand is the reaction of the demand for reaping A to a variation in price of product B (Sloman, 2009). The formula will be as follows Cross Elasticity of Demand (AB) = %?QDa/%?Pb In this case the major determinant is the intimacy of the substitute or the complementary good. If good A is a substitute to good B, then a price rise in good B will result in the rise in demand of good A. However, if good B is a c omplementary good to A, than an increment in price of B will decrease the demand for well-grounded A. Income Elasticity of demand (IED) is the other concept which considers the income of any given individual and the relative reaction of a change in that income to that of the quantity demanded. The determinant of the IED is the necessity of the good. For developed countries, the demand for luxury goods rises quickly with an increase in the consumer income in respect to the demand of basic goods (Sloman, 2009). The formula is as follows Yed= %?Qd/%?Y The high confirmatory value of the Cross Price Elasticity of Demand (CED) for stream orchid against Eagle shows that the two products are rattling close substitutes of distributively other. This value of Cross Price Elasticity shows that the two companies are constantly competing with each other. A slight decrease in the price of Eagle products will hugely decrease the touchstone Demanded of chatterbox. The concept of advertising and marketing can be related with the Cross Price Elasticity of Demand. The concept of printing and consumer loyalty can be created for any company with intelligent marketing and heavy advertisements. Consumers have a choice when there are competitors competing to win them with the same products. Such a high overlay price elasticity of demand for Magpie against Eagle shows that they have not been able to create brand loyalty for its customers. They do not have the market power to reduce the substitution effect i.e. by creating brand loyalty and attracting customers. First let us take the situation of Magpie and the Eagle, with a mar price elasticity of +3.2. It can be interpreted with the formula. CED is the sensitivity of demand for Magpie to an alteration in the respective price of Eagle. The major determining factor for cross elasticity is the extra intimacy of the product to Magpie. The overconfident value shows that an enhancement in the price of Eagle will escalate the dem and for Magpie and vice versa. The large value of a positive 3.2 shows that a 1% increase in the price of Eagle will result in a massive 3.2% increase in the quantity demanded for Magpie. and then and change in the price of the competitor will be closely monitored by Magpie. This high positive relation shows that consumers are very sensitive to price changes and will shift their interest to Eagle if Magpie increases its prices. There is also a positive relationship between the Quantity Demanded of Magpie and the change in the consumer

Franchising Business Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Franchising Business - Essay instanceIt acts as a good source of income for the franchisor. It occurs finished the regular payment of royalty fees, franchise fees, levies and specie from private labeling of products. Such funds form the capital backbone of the firm, hence an assured turnover of investments and profits. thither is also a decrease in the operational, distribution and advertising costs. There is a surge in the money used for finance and development issues2.In addition to that, there is a massive step-down in the operational costs as one can simply have a diminutive organization as compared to the absolute ownership of operational locations. There is a great uniformity of the employ and services rendered a degree of consistency and an increase in productivity hence. There is a stop system to facilitate and measure up the quality of services, otherwise known as quality sureness unit. Customer care and public relations are excellent leading to an increase in the bo ilersuit sales.Furthermore, it ensures that the products are located in strategic places where consumers can easily access them. It increases the number of selling points through utilization of other peoples businesses. There is a faster expansion with an overall put up of reduced effect of competitors.From the utilization of the franchising system, the performance of a firm that has utilized the model in trade the products is useful and better than the one having various branches. It is because people who have the motivation and the urge to increase the sales and the overall profits do the operations. It remains difficult to motivate managers to such extents.